• sbv@sh.itjust.works
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    3 days ago

    What prevents the malicious admin from telling the browser to sign arbitrary messages without exporting the keys?

    • cadekat@pawb.social
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      3 days ago

      They can, for sure. You need a few more bits to make it reasonably secure.

      For this particular problem, a revocation key that isn’t accessible to the instance might be sufficient? That adds complexity and something else the user has to remember…

      • sbv@sh.itjust.works
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        3 days ago

        How would you make it secure? It seems like the home instance admin would be able to sign arbitrary messages whenever the user connects with a browser.

        • cadekat@pawb.social
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          3 days ago

          Indeed, yeah. You’d have to publish a message with your revocation key that disclaims the forgeries.

          • sbv@sh.itjust.works
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            2 days ago

            How would users see the forgeries? Presumably the malicious admin would filter them from their feed.

            • cadekat@pawb.social
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              2 days ago

              That’s a good point! I guess you’d need to migrate to another instance, but people still on the malicious instance wouldn’t see your revocations. That’s a visible and attributable fault though… Or have clients pull revocations from all the instances they know about, but that could overload smaller servers… Hm… Great insight!