I would push back heavily on the idea that U.S. violence abroad has fundamentally changed. The methods cycle between covert and overt, but the underlying imperial practice has been remarkably consistent. From Vietnam and Korea to Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and the permanent siege of Iran and Cuba, the U.S. has always combined soft power with mass violence, sanctions/economic warfare, regime change, and proxy conflicts. There has never been a peaceful liberal phase since it’s inception, just periods where the repression was more deniable. It’s important to remember that since it’s inception the US has been involved in direct military conflict for all but 17 years of it’s roughly 250years of existence.
There’s also Chile, Peru, Somalia and many others. Coups, death squads, structural adjustment, drone campaigns, and engineered instability. This is the standard operating procedure of the empire. What I think makes this feel new is simply that the U.S. is losing its uncontested dominance, so the coercion is becoming louder and less subtle(despite how unsubtle it already was for the most part).
This tone shift isn’t because the beast has transformed, it more goes to show its margins are shrinking. When soft power stops working, hard power has always filled the gap. China isn’t facing a qualitatively different empire(yet), it’s facing a declining one. This is exactly why I believe the CPC is prioritizing industrial strength, internal stability, and alternative development networks over dramatic confrontations. They don’t seem to be underestimating U.S. brutality but rather focused on building strength while surviving it long enough for its material base to erode(for the quantitative to add up to the qualitative) and for the inevitable shift in balance of forces that will come with that.
I agree with your first point. The US has essentially always been at war. It may not have changed it’s modus operandi, but it certainly has both accelerated and intensified. I, for one, don’t believe I can recall so many operations within the span of one year. Neither have they been done so brazenly. But such is nature of rising fascism.
I do stand firm in thinking the beast has transformed though. The empire is certainly in decline as you said (the inevitable outcome of an imperialist state). But I think that has turned the angry, hungry dog into a cornered angry, hungry dog.
Taking a step back for a moment, who could possibly say what the right course of action would be against something so wild and unpredictable?
All that being said, I don’t necessarily support dramatic action being taken by China (depending on your definition of such), but providing more support to nations that have good relations opens the possibility of providing them the means of prolonged resistance. This in turn would benefit China in the long run. If nothing else, it would buy them more time.
I would push back heavily on the idea that U.S. violence abroad has fundamentally changed. The methods cycle between covert and overt, but the underlying imperial practice has been remarkably consistent. From Vietnam and Korea to Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and the permanent siege of Iran and Cuba, the U.S. has always combined soft power with mass violence, sanctions/economic warfare, regime change, and proxy conflicts. There has never been a peaceful liberal phase since it’s inception, just periods where the repression was more deniable. It’s important to remember that since it’s inception the US has been involved in direct military conflict for all but 17 years of it’s roughly 250years of existence.
There’s also Chile, Peru, Somalia and many others. Coups, death squads, structural adjustment, drone campaigns, and engineered instability. This is the standard operating procedure of the empire. What I think makes this feel new is simply that the U.S. is losing its uncontested dominance, so the coercion is becoming louder and less subtle(despite how unsubtle it already was for the most part).
This tone shift isn’t because the beast has transformed, it more goes to show its margins are shrinking. When soft power stops working, hard power has always filled the gap. China isn’t facing a qualitatively different empire(yet), it’s facing a declining one. This is exactly why I believe the CPC is prioritizing industrial strength, internal stability, and alternative development networks over dramatic confrontations. They don’t seem to be underestimating U.S. brutality but rather focused on building strength while surviving it long enough for its material base to erode(for the quantitative to add up to the qualitative) and for the inevitable shift in balance of forces that will come with that.
I agree with your first point. The US has essentially always been at war. It may not have changed it’s modus operandi, but it certainly has both accelerated and intensified. I, for one, don’t believe I can recall so many operations within the span of one year. Neither have they been done so brazenly. But such is nature of rising fascism.
I do stand firm in thinking the beast has transformed though. The empire is certainly in decline as you said (the inevitable outcome of an imperialist state). But I think that has turned the angry, hungry dog into a cornered angry, hungry dog.
Taking a step back for a moment, who could possibly say what the right course of action would be against something so wild and unpredictable?
All that being said, I don’t necessarily support dramatic action being taken by China (depending on your definition of such), but providing more support to nations that have good relations opens the possibility of providing them the means of prolonged resistance. This in turn would benefit China in the long run. If nothing else, it would buy them more time.