On quantities: I don’t have exact figures for now, but from this Treasury designation it appears China is supplying a sizeable chunk of solid-rocket precursors to Iran, enough to show up as a repeated sanctions target, which implies volume. ISW also notes ongoing precursor shipments via sanctioned vessels, though without public tonnage (it does however estimate 260 rockets worth).
On dual-use parts like guidance modules or SAM components: exact figures are unfortunately impossible to pin down, they’re deliberately obscured under commercial HS codes. But the pattern of repeated OFAC designations suggests the flow is sizeable enough to matter.
On quantities: I don’t have exact figures for now, but from this Treasury designation it appears China is supplying a sizeable chunk of solid-rocket precursors to Iran, enough to show up as a repeated sanctions target, which implies volume. ISW also notes ongoing precursor shipments via sanctioned vessels, though without public tonnage (it does however estimate 260 rockets worth).
For the YLC-8B: it’s reported that several units have shipped (this one also notes beidou access), but exact figures aren’t publicly verified. These systems typically deploy in batteries of 3–4, so “several” likely means at least one battery.
On dual-use parts like guidance modules or SAM components: exact figures are unfortunately impossible to pin down, they’re deliberately obscured under commercial HS codes. But the pattern of repeated OFAC designations suggests the flow is sizeable enough to matter.
Thanks a lot for the sources!